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ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiffs' Argument that Defendant had Actual Notice of 
this Lawsuit Prior to Entry of Judgment was not Raised in 
the Trial Court Proceedings and may not be Raised for the 
First Time on Appeal. 
In their Brieff Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Romero had 
actual knowledge of the pendency of this lawsuit before entry of 
the default judgment. Plaintiffs' argument is based on a 
handwritten note found in the trial court file, apparently 
written by Defendant and addressed to the court clerk. 
This allegation that Defendant had actual notice of the 
pendency of the lawsuit was not raised by Plaintiffs in the trial 
court proceedings. Although the handwritten note was presumably 
in the trial court file at the time of Defendant's motion to set 
aside the default judgment, it was not brought to the attention 
of Defendant's counsel nor of the court.1 
The Affidavit of Lester Romero specifically states that he 
learned of the existence of this case for the first time on July 
21, 1994. This statement was not contested or disputed in any of 
the pleadings filed with the trial court.2 The trial court made 
no findings to the contrary, and the trial court's ruling is not 
predicated on the existence of actual notice. The parties and 
1
 It seems likely that Plaintiffs' counsel would have raised 
this issue if he had been aware of it, and that he probably did 
not discover the handwritten note until he reviewed the court 
file in connection with this appeal. 
2
 Nor was this statement contested orally, since there was 
no oral argument on Defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment. 
the trial court all accepted the accuracy of Mr. Romero's 
Affidavit. 
If Mr. Romero's statement had been challenged in the trial 
court, he would have had the opportunity to explain the 
discrepancy between his Affidavit and the handwritten note in the 
court file. The trial court would then have been in a position 
to make a finding as to the date that Mr. Romero first learned of 
the pendency of this case. Instead, Plaintiffs now present to 
the Court of Appeals an unresolved factual issue which has not 
been presented to the trial court. 
Generally, appellate courts will not consider issues or 
facts raised for the first time on appeal. The rule is 
summarized as follows in C.J.S.: 
When a cause is brought up for appellate review, 
a party cannot assume an attitude inconsistent with, or 
different from, that taken by him at the trial, and is 
restricted to the theory on which the cause was 
prosecuted or defended in the court below, although 
there is authority to the contrary. This rule has been 
said to apply whether the result in the trial court is 
in favor of the party or against him. 4 C.J.S. Appeal 
and Error § 204 (citations omitted.) 
Where a fact is admitted, conceded, or assumed 
without objection in the trial court, it cannot be 
contested in the appellate court or objected that there 
was no evidence on the question, but the theory in the 
trial court will be adhered to. 4 C.J.S. Appeal and 
Error § 206 (citations omitted.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the same rule. In Ong 
International (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (1993), 
the Supreme Court stated: 
With limited exceptions, the practice of this 
court has been to decline consideration of issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. 850 P.2d at 455 
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(quotiiA Espinal v. Salt Lake v,itv Ba. of Educ, 
797 P.2< 413 [Utah 1990]). 
Dcic. _ we a reach this and 
other new . the L time on appeal 
because they are real. ' ew arguments as opposed to new 
issues. We decline to honor such a distinction. Our 
concern is whether an argument was addressed in the 
first instance to the trial court.... 'Failure to 
raise the point 1" below 1 precludes its consideration 
here. / 850 P.2d at 455r note 31 (emphasis added, 
citations emitted, "i 
Under the reason: r:- ° .SL^.I^. .
 t 
i ^^^.ent- ^onrlict. between 
Affidavit and * h: ..indwritten nctr; ; i - t ria* court f' ! P . hut 
should consider +-^ :- — -v • isuiiifit 11111• • 
ij(.iiiiiij mi I in mi mi in ,1 ii| 
II. Plaintiffs 
Summons and Complain i l l II Ill1 i in i in 1 mi I III lllliiiiiii IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 
R e s i d e n c e . 
The Statement of Facts and the Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 
show that there v=-- +l * * - e 
alleiupLed tu uen . ^ eix uuiiuuUiia ana complaint. 
' Since the *:.i T t- this app* . filed, Defendant has 
noticed that both the Return on Pi -;erved (R 10) and the 
Affidavit of Deputy Jack Hill in wnic n^ ^escribes his attempts 
to personally serve process (R 64) contain the wrong case number. 
They refer to a case number 94001658f rather than to this case. 
Since neither of these documents gives the names of any of the 
parties to the case, and since the Affidavit refers to an 
"annexed summons, complaint" which are not actually annexed, 
Defendant now questions whether Deputy Jack Hill attempted to 
serve the correct summons and complaint, or attempted to serve 
the summons and complaint from case number 94001658. If this 
Court is inclined to consider inconsistencies in the record which 
were not presented to the trial court, Defendant requests that 
this issue also be considered. 
aiai \— KJ U, X 
:< p i a i n - r Failure ' • 11 l 
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First, there was the correct address of Defendant's 
residence: "6270 S. Margray Drive, West Jordan, Utah 84084." 
This was the first address used by Plaintiffs' counsel in his 
letter of November 18, 1993. It was also apparently the address 
supplied by Plaintiffs' counsel to the Salt Lake County Sheriff 
for service of process, since the deputy stated that he attempted 
service of process there. But Plaintiff failed to inform the 
trial court of this address and failed to mail the summons and 
complaint to it. 
Second, there was the address on the envelope which 
Defendant used to reply to counsel's November 18 letter: "Airport 
Motel, 6270 S. 2005 W., West Jordan, Utah 84084." Plaintiffs did 
not send copies of the summons and complaint to this address 
either. Although this address uses the street coordinate, 2005 
W., rather than the street name, Margray Drive, it is virtually 
the same as the first address and any mail sent to this second 
address would likely have been received by Defendant. 
The third address was the address appearing in the recorded 
quit claim deed: "c/o Horace Knowlton, General Delivery, 1760 W. 
2100 S., Salt Lake City, Utah 84111." For reasons known only to 
Plaintiffs or their counsel, this is the only address to which 
they mailed copies of the summons and complaint. Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs omitted the words "c/o Horace Knowlton," presumably 
because Plaintiffs' counsel knew that Horace Knowlton was dead. 
Thus, of the three addresses available to Plaintiffs, they chose 
the one in care of a dead man at the general post office for Salt 
-4-
Lake City, and they omitted the name of the dead man. It is 
absurd to argue that this meets the diligence requirements of 
Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987).4 
Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the general delivery 
address appeared on the quit claim deed recorded by Defendant in 
1993. But this quit claim deed was typed and signed in 1960. 
There is no evidence as to when the general delivery address was 
written on the deed. It may have been written in I960, in 1993, 
or sometime in between. It seems likely that the address was 
written while Horace Knowlton was still alive, perhaps years 
before the date of recording. 
Plaintiffs also make much of the fact that the general 
delivery address appears in the Davis County Treasurer's records. 
But it is common knowledge that county treasurers obtain 
addresses for tax notices from recorded deeds. Defendant did not 
"give" this address to the county treasurer, as Plaintiffs claim. 
Defendant simply recorded the quit claim deed with this address 
on it and the county treasurer copied the address from the deed. 
Plaintiffs point out that the relief given by the trial 
court was in rem relief only. This does not, however, affect the 
diligence required in using alternate forms of service of 
process. In Carlson v. Bos, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly repudiated the notion that the validity of an alternate 
4
 See detailed discussion of Carlson v. Bos on pages 13 and 
14 of Defendant's initial Brief. 
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form of notice depends on whether a case is in rem or in personam; 
[W]e must and do disavow Graham to the extent that it 
bases the form of notice required by the federal 
constitution on whether the action is labeled in rem or 
in personam. 740 P.2d at 1271. (See also footnote 5 
on same page.) 
This is not a case where Plaintiffs had to make a difficult 
search to find an address for Defendant. All they had to do was 
use the addresses already in their possession. For the cost of 
a few dollars, they could have sent notice to all three 
addresses. Instead, they chose just one, and, intentionally or 
not, they chose the one that was insufficient and the least 
likely to reach Defendant. In short, although diligent efforts 
may have been made to personally serve process, Plaintiffs were 
not diligent in their efforts to notify Defendant by publication 
and mailing. 
III. Since the Service of Process on Defendant was Fatally 
Defective, Defendant is not Required to Show a Meritorious 
Defense in Order to Have the Default Judgment Set Aside. 
As explained above and in Defendant's initial Brief, the 
service of process in this case fails to comply with the 
requirements of Carlson v. Bos and Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Because the service of 
process on Defendant was fatally defective, the judgment entered 
against him is void and there is no requirement that he show that 
he has a meritorious defense in order to have it set aside. 
-6-
In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288f 290 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court quoted with approval the following from Wright and 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2862: 
Rule 60(b)(4) [the equivalent to Utah Rule 
60(b)(5)] authorizes relief from void judgments. 
Necessarily a motion under this part of the rule 
differs markedly from motions under the other clauses 
of Rule 60(b). There is no question of discretion on 
the part of the court when a motion is under Rule 
60(b)(4). Nor is there any requirement, as there 
usually is when default judgments are attacked under 
Rule 60(b) , that the moving party show that he has a 
meritorious defense. 712 P.2d at 290 (emphasis added.) 
IV. If a Meritorious Defense is Required, Defendant's Affidavit 
Presents One. 
If service of process was not fatally defective, so that 
Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment does not 
come under clause (5) of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, then there may be a requirement that Defendant present 
a meritorious defense.5 An examination of Mr. Romero's Affidavit 
(included in Addendum 2 to Defendant's initial Brief) shows that 
5
 In Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Usually, it is not appropriate on Rule 60(b) motions to 
examine the merits of the claim decided by the default 
judgment. 684 P.2d at 55. 
Defendant acknowledges, however, that while this language in 
Larsen has never been explained or disavowed, other cases decided 
by the Utah Supreme Court appear to require a party seeking 
relief from a default judgment to show a meritorious defense. 
See, e.g.. State ex rel. Department of Social Services v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983); Erickson v. Schenkers 
Intern. Forwarders. 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). 
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it contains all of the elements necessary to establish a complete 
defense.6 
A. A Meritorious Defense can be Presented by Affidavit. 
The fact that Defendant did not file an Answer or 
Counterclaim does not mean that no defense was presented. 
Plaintiffs have cited no authority holding that a defense cannot 
be presented by Affidavit. Rule 60(b) does not require an Answer 
or Counterclaim — it refers only to a "motion" to set aside a 
judgment. 
In Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 376 P.2d 951 (Utah 
1962), the Utah Supreme Court set aside a default judgment based 
on defenses presented by affidavit only: 
Defense attorneys immediately on that date prepared and 
filed motions to set aside the default judgments. The 
motions were later, by permission of the court, 
supplemented by affidavits setting out the above facts 
and claiming meritorious defenses. We are persuaded 
that those facts show excusable neglect by the parties 
desiring to defend these actions and that they moved 
with dispatch to have the defaults set aside. 376 P.2d 
at 953 (emphasis added.) 
B. It was not Necessary for Defendant to File a 
Counterclaim Demanding Foreclosure in Order to Defend Against 
Plaintiffs' Quiet Title Claim. 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's only meritorious defense 
"would be a valid counterclaim upon the 1960 note, to be 
6
 Plaintiffs7 Brief addresses only one issue relating to 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure — whether or not 
Defendant presented a meritorious defense. Plaintiffs apparently 
do not dispute that Defendant has met the other requirements of 
Rule 60(b). 
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foreclosed based upon the 1960 deed..."7 This is incorrect. In 
their complaintf Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendant has 
no lien or interest in the subject real property.8 In order to 
defend against this claim, Defendant need only show that he holds 
a valid lien. If Defendant shows this, the relief requested by 
Plaintiffs must be denied. Defendant does not have to foreclose 
his lien just because Plaintiffs have brought a quiet title 
action against him. 
C. Defendant's Affidavit Adequately Alleges a Debt, a Lien 
Against the Subject Property Securing the Debt, and Facts 
Avoiding the Statute of Limitations. 
In his Affidavit, Mr. Romero states that he sold the 
property which is the subject of this action to Plaintiffs for 
$6,000.00 and that the purchase price for the property was paid 
by delivery of a promissory note.9 He also states that the 
promissory note was secured by a deed of trust. The quit claim 
deed covering the subject property was given to him as 
"additional security."10 Several paragraphs of the Affidavit make 
it abundantly clear that Mr. Romero maintains that the promissory 
note has not been paid in full: 
7
 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, p. 21. 
8
 Complaint, p. 3. 
9
 Affidavit of Lester Romero, Us 5, 6. 
10
 Affidavit of Lester Romero, I 6. Defendant does not 
dispute Plaintiffs7 claim that the quit claim deed should be 
deemed to be a mortgage rather than an absolute conveyance. Even 
so, it is valid lien or interest which precludes entry of 
judgment quieting title in Plaintiffs as prayed in the Complaint. 
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7. The plaintiffs did not make all the payments 
required by the promissory note in a timely fashion and 
I had to constantly work with them to get the required 
payments. 
10. There have been disagreements between me and 
the plaintiffs on the amount still due on the 
promissory note for several years. 
11. Not being able to convince the plaintiffs to 
make the payments still due, I recorded the quit claim 
deed on May 24, 1993. 
15. In response to Mr. Fadel's letter, I sent a 
lengthy reply indicating that the plaintiffs had not 
paid the promissory note off and that I recorded the 
quit claim deed pursuant to the agreement I had with 
the plaintiffs that I would do so if they did not 
pay.... 
Defendant's Affidavit also sets forth facts which preclude 
Plaintiffs from relying on the statute of limitations. In 
paragraph 8 of his Affidavit, Mr. Romero states: "At no time did 
I allow more than three (3) years to go by without receiving a 
payment from the plaintiffs." Plaintiffs complain that this 
statement is ambiguous but it is actually quite clear. It means 
that there was at least one payment made during the first three-
year period after execution of the promissory note, at least one 
payment made during the second three-year period, and so forth 
until the latest three-year period. There was never any three-
year period after the execution of the promissory note in which 
no payment was made. Plaintiffs wonder "what action he 
[Defendant] had ever taken if a payment had not been made within 
three years."11 According to Mr. Romero's Affidavit, Plaintiffs' 
question is misdirected. Mr. Romero states that he constantly 
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, p. 22. 
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worked with Plaintiffs and the event contemplated by Plaintiffs' 
question never occurred. 
Section 78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ("Utah Code") 
provides: 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of 
the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an 
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, 
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, 
an action may be brought within the period prescribed 
for the same after such payment, acknowledgment or 
promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in 
writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. 
When a right of action is barred by the provisions of 
any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause 
of action or ground of defense. 
This case clearly comes within the parameters of section 78-
12-44. Defendant's note, deed of trust, and quit claim deed are 
written contracts which would ordinarily be subject to a six-year 
limitation period.12 Under section 78-12-44, the six-year period 
was renewed each time a payment was made to Defendant.13 
Mr. Romero does not state exactly when the last payment was 
made under his secured promissory note, but according to 
paragraph 8 of his Affidavit, it had to be within three years of 
September 6, 1994, the date of the Affidavit. Accordingly, Mr. 
Romero's note, trust deed and quit claim deed will not be barred 
by the statute of limitations until at least September 6, 1997, 
six years after the latest payment. 
12
 Utah Code § 78-12-23; Cromoton v. Jenson, 1 P.2d 242 (Utah 
1931). 
13
 See also, Crompton v. Jenson, 1 P.2d 242 (Utah 1931), 
holding that a defendant who made payments on a note and mortgage 
could not subsequently argue that they were barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
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V. Defendant is Entitled to Have his Alleged Defenses Tried. 
Defendant's Affidavit sets up contested issues of fact which 
Defendant is entitled to have tried. Plaintiffs claim that 
Defendant's note and trust deed were paid in full in 1980. 
Defendant counters that the note and trust deed have not been 
paid in full and there are sums still owing. Plaintiffs claim 
that they have made no payments on the note since 1980. 
Defendant counters that he has never allowed more than three 
years to pass without receiving at least one payment on the note. 
If Defendant's allegations are truef Plaintiffs are not entitled 
to judgment. 
In Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., 882 
P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court describes the 
showing a defendant must make in order to establish a meritorious 
defense under Rule 60(b). A defendant does not have to set forth 
specific facts showing his meritorious defense.14 A defendant 
need only "proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible 
merit as would justify a trial of the issue thus raised."15 The 
defenses which the Erickson court relied upon to overturn the 
default judgment consisted only of general denials of allegations 
contained in the complaint. They were not as specific as the 
defenses alleged in Mr. Romero's Affidavit. Plaintiffs claim 
14
 See discussion at 882 P.2d 1148, rejecting this standard 
which had previously been endorsed by two justices in State ex 
rel. Department of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1983) . 
15
 882 P.2d at 1149. 
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that Defendant should have stated the date and amount of the last 
payment in order to allege a meritorious defense.16 Plaintiffs' 
position is clearly contrary to Erickson. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has met all of the requirements to have the 
default judgment against him set aside under Rule 60(b). He has 
filed a timely motion. He has shown that the judgment should be 
set aside as a void judgment under clause (5) of Rule 60(b) 
because of fatally defective service. In the alternativef he has 
shown that the judgment should be set aside under clauses (1), 
(3), (4) and/or (7) of Rule 60(b) and he has established a 
meritorious defense to Plaintiffs7 claims. Due to Plaintiffs7 
lack of diligence in using an alternate form of service of 
process, Defendant has been deprived of the opportunity to have 
his defenses heard. The default judgment against Defendant 
should be vacated so that he can have his day in court. 
DATED this n^ day of May, 1995. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
ott Lungberc 
By _^^LcJ^^^S^±c 
Sc ^ g 
Attorneys for E^ elfendant/ 
Appellant 
16
 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, p. 22. 
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